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IMMIGRATION LAW
INTRODUCTION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided several cases involving immi-
gration law during the 1994-95 survey period.' Because the Tenth Circuit
serves as the first level of judicial review of administrative decisions concern-
ing asylum and deportation,2 many cases presented to the court were little
more than judicial confirmation of administrative decisions. The Tenth Circuit
did, however, decide several noteworthy cases as well as a few issues of first
impression.
After a brief discussion in Part I of the background of the interlocking
statutory components of United States immigration law, Part II of this Survey
examines suspension of deportation and the standard of proof that an alien
must meet to remain in this country. This year, the court continued its trend of
narrow construction of the elements of discretionary relief. As a result, few
aliens met the required standard.
Part III discusses the court's interpretation of statutes providing for asy-
lum and withholding of deportation. Both the discretionary grant of asylum
and the nondiscretionary withholding of deportation hinge on the applicant's
ability to articulate an objective fear of persecution. As in the cases involving
suspension of deportation, the court strictly followed the statutory standard,
denying applications based on general political upheaval and subjective fear of
persecution. In a matter of first impression, the court was asked to determine
the burdens of proof and production that both the applicant and the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) must meet throughout the review pro-
cess. A vehement dissent suggests that American courts have not seen the last
of this issue.
Part IV examines a case involving the constitutional implications of the
immigration process as it applies to aliens who marry United States citizens.
The Tenth Circuit rejected a novel constitutional attack aimed at invalidating
an amendment to the immigration laws designed to flush out fraudulent mar-
riages. Finally, Part V examines an issue of growing importance in immigra-
tion law: the fate of naturalized citizens convicted of felony offenses. These
cases involve prisoners seeking to compel deportation as well as those wishing
to prevent deportation, and the effect of an aggravated felony conviction on
the deportation process.
1. The survey period covers decisions handed down between September 1, 1994, and Au-
gust 31, 1995.
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(2) (1994). Upon review, the administrative determination is subject
only to procedural protections of due process. Courtney E. Pellegrino, Comment, A Generously
Fluctuating Scale of Rights: Resident Aliens and First Amendment Free Speech Protections, 46
SMU L. REV. 225, 229 (1992).
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I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
The term "immigration" refers to the movement of people from one coun-
try to another.3 Laws controlling entry into the United States are almost ex-
clusively the product of the twentieth century.' The earliest such restriction,
however, came about as a result of the depression of the 1870s and a concur-
rent increase in racial animosity toward Asian nationals.5
The statutes and decisions that constitute substantive immigration law
form only a part of the unique framework used to regulate immigration.6 In
the United States, executive and departmental orders, executive proclamations,
and treaties also affect immigration.7 This Survey focuses on the substantive
statutes, as interpreted and applied by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Relevant orders, proclamations, and treaties will be addressed, but only in the
context of cases presented to the Tenth Circuit during the 1994-95 survey
period.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA)' provided the first
comprehensive scheme of immigration control in the United States.9 Congress
has amended the INA five times,' ° and current national immigration policy is
the product of over 150 years of cultural and societal development."
Immigration remains a complicated area of the law, comprised of many
elements. 2 Congress promulgates the controlling statutes,"' as in other areas
3. RICHARD A. BOSWELL & GILBERT P. CARRASCO, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW
4 (1991).
4. Joseph Minsky et al., Introductory Overview of Immigration Law and Practice, C394
ALI-ABA 1, 7-11 (1989).
5. AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE
To LAW AND PRACTICE 1-2 (1992). Congress enacted two statutes governing immigration prior to
1875. Id. The Alien Act authorized the President to deport "dangerous" aliens. Ch. 58, 1 Stat.
570, 571 (1798) (expired 1800). Id. In 1862, Congress passed a law prohibiting the import of
Chinese slave laborers. An Act to Prohibit the "Coolie Trade" by American Citizens in American
Vessels, ch. 27, 12 Stat. 340 (1862) (repealed 1974); see FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra, at 1-2. To a
great extent, this racial animosity continues today. For example, one commentator referred to
immigration reform as the "snake oil" of the 1994 California state elections. Edith Z. Friedler,
From Extreme Hardship to Extreme Deference: United States Deportation of Its Own Children, 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491, 492 (1995).
6. E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-
1965, at 383 (1981).
7. Id. By definition, international law concerns only the principles and rules of conduct
between nations. David D. Jividen, Comment, Rediscovering the Burden of Proof for Asylum and
the Withholding of Deportation, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 945 (1986). Therefore, although many
treaties and agreements between nations establish refugee rights, it is incorrect to analyze interna-
tional refugee rights in the context of rights within sovereign nations. Id.
8. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (cur-
rent version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1994)).
9. The INA served to collect the numerous, scattered statutory provisions already on the
books. Minsky et al., supra note 4, at 9. The INA made no substantive changes other than the
creation of new, ideological bases for exclusion. Id. President Truman vetoed the bill because of
the exclusion provisions, but Congress overrode the veto. Id.
10. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1966); Immigration and Nation-
ality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703 (1978); Refugee Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1981); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1987); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978
(1991).
11. HUTCHINSON, supra note 6, at 3.
12. BOSWELL & CARRASCO, supra note 3, at 7.
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of law, but four agencies of the executive branch are responsible for enforce-
ment of immigration laws: the Department of Justice (DOJ); the Department
of State; the Department of Labor; and the Public Health Service. 4 This Sur-
vey limits its discussion to the role of the INS, an agency within the DOJ, 5
in the enforcement of immigration laws. Although the other agencies men-
tioned play an important part in the overall functioning of immigration proce-
dure in the United States, they are beyond the focus of the Tenth Circuit deci-
sions in this Survey. 6
The INS is divided into four geographic regions providing administrative
direction to the district offices. 7 The regional directors' functions are primar-
ily managerial, with the INS Commissioner being responsible for determining
policy and overall management of the agency. 8 The Executive Office for Im-
migration Review (EOIR), the agency that presides over deportation hearings,
exclusion hearings, and other related matters at the administrative level, is di-
vided into two levels. 9 Immigration Judges (Us) preside over hearings, take
evidence, and determine deportability of alien applicants," while the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) exercises appellate review of the U decisions.2'
13. In forging a nation almost entirely from immigrants and first- or second-generation na-
tionals, the founding fathers might have been expected to explicitly address immigration issues.
The Constitution, however, is silent on these subjects. THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MAR-
TIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 1 (2d ed. 1991); see also Katherine Tonnas, Comment,
Out of a Far Country: The Sojourns of Cubans, Vietnamese, Haitians, and Chinese to America, 20
S.U. L. REV. 295, 295 (1993) (discussing George Washington's view of America as an "asylum
for the unfortunate of other countries" and Thomas Jefferson's affirmation of the "hospitality...
extended to our fathers arriving in this land"). Although Congress has no explicit power to reg-
ulate immigration, the Supreme Court has held that the regulation of immigration falls within
Congress's Commerce Clause authority over the flow of commerce across national borders. See
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 288 (1849); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 600
(1884). The Court has also read Congress's Article I, § 8 power "to establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization" to include immigration. Pellegrino, supra note 2, at 228-29. In addition, the Court
has held that immigration is a political question; therefore, congressional determinations regarding
the exclusion of aliens and the conditions placed upon entry of aliens are not subject to judicial
review. Id.
14. BOSWELL & CARRASCO, supra note 3, at 7.
15. Id.
16. For a brief description of the agencies within each governmental branch responsible for
enforcement of immigration laws, see Minsky et al., supra note 4, at 11-14.
17. Id. at 11. The district offices receive applications and petitions for immigration benefits,
enforce immigration laws, and institute deportation and exclusion proceedings when necessary. Id.
18. Id.
19. Noel A. Ferris, Developments in Procedures Before the Executive Office for Immigration
Review, in BASIC IMMIGRATION LAw 1993, at 213, 213 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac. Course Hand-
book Series No. 466, 1993).
20. Id. The decision of the U, whether oral or written, includes a review of the evidence, a
statement of factual findings supporting deportability, and a discussion of any discretionary relief
requested by the alien. Samuel A. Yee, Survey, Final Exit or Administrative Exhaustion? The
Deported Alien's Catch-22, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 605, 614 (1994).
21. See generally Ferris, supra note 19. The deportation order is automatically stayed pend-
ing full disposition by the BIA. Yee, supra note 20, at 616.
19961
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II. SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION
A. Background
When the INS learns of a deportable alien22 within the borders of the
United States, the agency initiates deportation proceedings by issuing an order
to show cause (OSC), which requires the alien to "show cause" as to why she
should not be deported.23 Pending the outcome of the deportation hearing, the
INS may take the alien into custody and either continue to hold her in custody
or release her under bond or on conditional parole.24 The Attorney General
then has discretion to revoke the bond or parole.25 Suspension of deporta-
tion,26 a discretionary grant by the United States Attorney General, represents
one form of relief an alien can request.27 Such a grant requires the applicant
to show that, although she may be deportable under immigration laws: (1) the
alien has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period
of not less than seven years; (2) the alien can offer evidence that during that
entire time she has been, and currently is, a person of good moral character;
and (3) the alien or the alien's spouse, parent, or child who is a United States
citizen would suffer extreme hardship as a result of the deportation." An
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994). The INA enumerates 33 grounds for deporting resident aliens.
Because these grounds may be applied retroactively, an alien is, in effect, "perpetually subject to
expulsion." Denyse Sabagh, Deportation, Exclusion, Discretionary Relief and Waivers, C505
ALI-ABA 337, 345 (1990). In addition, delay will not prevent the INS from bringing charges at
any time; there is no statute of limitations for deportation. Id.
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(1) (1994). The OSC notifies the alien of the deportation proceedings
and describes the grounds and factual allegations on which the proceedings are based. Sabagh,
supra note 22, at 346.
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1994).
25. Id. Historically, deportation proceedings began with an alien's arrest. Since changes in
INS procedures in 1956, however, they are more commonly initiated with the order, or motion, to
show cause. Yee, supra note 20, at 610.
Immigration laws now expressly provide for in absentia proceedings when an alien fails to
appear for a hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c); 8 C.F.R. § 3.26(a)-(b) (1995). A deportation order will
be issued if the INS establishes by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence that written
notice of the hearing was provided and that the alien is deportable. 8 U.S.C. § 1152b(c)(1). Pro-
vided that the notice was valid, review of an in absentia order is limited to whether the INS met
its burden and the reason for the alien's failure to appear. See Ferris, supra note 19.
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994).
27. The following applicants are, however, specifically excluded from eligibility for suspen-
sion of deportation:
(1) [A]liens who entered the United States as crew members after June 30, 1964; (2)
alien foreign medical graduates admitted in J nonimmigrant status, whether or not they
are subject to the two-year foreign residence requirement imposed on some J
nonimmigrants; (3) other J nonimmigrants who are subject to the two-year foreign resi-
dence requirement and have not received a waiver of it or fulfilled it; and (4) aliens who
are deportable under [8 U.S.C. § 1251](a)(4)(D) as persons who participated in Nazi-
directed persecution during World War II.
FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 5, at 7-73. A J nonimmigrant is an alien holder of a temporary
visa to enter the United States for scholastic reasons (i.e., a "student visa"). 8 U.S.C. §
I 101(a)(15)(J) (1994).
28. Under the provisions of § 1254(a)(2), if an alien is deportable under § 1251(a)(2) (crimi-
nal offenses), § 1251(a)(3) (failure to register and falsification of documents), or § 1251(a)(4) (se-
curity and related grounds), the criteria for suspension of deportation are stringent. The applicant
must show: (1) continuous physical presence in the United States for not less than 10 years imme-
diately following commission of the act or assumption of the status which constitutes the grounds
[Vol. 73:3
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alien must demonstrate evidence of all three elements to qualify for suspension
of deportation.29
An alien requesting a suspension of deportation often faces difficult evi-
dentiary problems.30 Continuous physical presence may be impossible to doc-
ument because of the transient lifestyle of many aliens.3' Also, as the follow-
ing case illustrates, proving extreme hardship often presents a formidable
barrier.32 In determining "extreme hardship," the INS considers factors such
as the alien's familial connections, medical problems, and the presence or ab-
sence of abuse or fraud in the applicant's immigration history.33 The INS
may also consider economic conditions in the alien's country of origin; how-
ever, the relative weakness of the "home country's" economy will not suf-
fice.34 Finally, even if the alien meets the required elements, the Attorney
General has discretion to grant or refuse adjustment of status to that of a per-
manent resident.35
B. Amaya v. INS36
1. Facts
The United States deported Amaya from the United States on June 10,
1985." 7 She subsequently re-entered the United States without inspection, and
on December 20, 1991, the INS again initiated deportation proceedings against
for deportation; (2) good moral character; and (3) hardship. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2). If the alien is
deportable for another reason--e.g., entry without inspection, being excludable at the time of
entry, violating nonimmigrant status, alien smuggling, or becoming a public charge within five
years of entry-the alien may be able to apply for suspension of deportation under the relatively
looser standards of § 1254(a)(1). FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 5, at 7-72.
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1). Some have criticized this standard as "practically impossible" to
meet. Friedler, supra note 5, at 494.
30. Materials are available to assist an attorney in pursuing withholding of deportation
claims. See, e.g., Minsky et al., supra note 4, at 25-29 (offering pragmatic advice for proceeding
with a matter before the INS). Other sources offer suggestions for gathering important evidentiary
documentation. See, e.g., Arthur C. Helton, Gaining Status for Your Client Under the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, in COPING WITH THE NEW IMMIGRATION LAW 123 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 329, 1987) (discussing the unique evidentiary problems
facing aliens). For guidelines on bolstering weak cases, see generally Margaret C. Makar & Philip
M. Alterman, Suspension of Deportation, in DEPORTATION DEFENSE (Continuing Legal Educ. of
Colo., Inc., 1994) and MATERIALS ON SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION 17-39 (National Lawyers'
Guild, Nat'l Convention Seminar, 1986).
31. The migratory lifestyles of many immigrant farm workers illustrates this problem. Al-
though they may have been in the United States for the required time period, many migrant farm
workers can not offer proof of continuous presence. To address the problems of these workers,
Congress created a legalization program for "special agricultural workers" (SAWs) and an admis-
sions program for "replenishment agricultural workers" (RAWs). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160, 1161 (1994);
ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 13, at 685-88.
32. Friedler, supra note 5, at 494.
33. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 5, at 7-74.
34. Id.
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1254.
36. 36 F.3d 992 (10th Cir. 1994).
37. Amaya, 36 F.3d at 993.
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her.3" At a hearing on June 30, 1992, she conceded her deportability, but re-
quested a suspension of deportation.39
The IJ found that, although Amaya had been continuously physically
present within the United States for seven years, she had failed to show either
good moral character or extreme hardship.' Because Amaya had pleaded
guilty to welfare fraud during the seven-year period, the IJ concluded she did
not establish good moral character.4 Amaya argued that deportation would
result in decreased educational opportunities for her citizen children. 2 The U
ruled this did not qualify as extreme hardship, 3 and the BIA affirmed."
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision on narrow grounds. 5 The court
agreed that decreased educational opportunities did not constitute extreme
hardship.' The court chose to confine its ruling to that issue, however, with-
out discussing whether a welfare fraud conviction precludes an applicant from
asserting good moral character. Since suspension of deportation requires an
applicant to affirmatively prove all of the criteria, Amaya's failure to meet the
extreme hardship prong disqualified her from consideration for the requested
relief, regardless of her moral character."
C. Analysis
Applicants who have established sufficient ties to their community within
the United States and who prove themselves a positive attribute to that com-
munity may qualify for suspension of deportation.49 Because of the discre-
tionary nature of the relief, the Supreme Court has referred to it as "admin-
istrative grace."5 The statute providing this relief employs specific criteria
for evaluating the applicant and, absent a showing of all requisite elements,
the discretionary relief will not be granted.
D. Other Circuits
Several other circuit courts of appeals ruled on applications for suspension
of deportation in the past year. In many instances, the other circuit courts also




41. Id. at 994.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 994-95.




49. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 13, at 618.
50. United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72, 77 (1957).
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an applicant, ruling that the BIA had not abused its discretion in denying
relief." In addition, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits squarely confronted the
issue the Tenth Circuit sidestepped.52 Both circuits held that evidence of
fraud precludes an applicant from showing good moral character, thus statuto-
rily barring the applicant from suspension of deportation. 3
In far more cases, however, appellate courts in other circuits found that
the agency had abused its discretion, and remanded the cases to the agency for
reconsideration based upon the appellate court findings.54
51. Hussein v. INS, 61 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 1995) (ruling that alien failed to show lawful
domicile for seven years); Raya-Ledesma v. INS, 55 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding seven-year
residency requirement not violative of equal protection principles); Miranda v. INS, 51 F.3d 767,
768-69 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting transsexual applicant's medical and social hardship claim);
Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming agency determination that appli-
cant did not show how joining him in Great Britain would cause extreme hardship to his family);
Salas-Velazquez v. INS, 34 F.3d 705, 707-08 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that applicant's previous
attempt to evade immigration laws through a sham marriage precluded a showing of good moral
character, despite his bona fide second marriage, and that applicant failed to show extreme hard-
ship to his resident wife and children since the wife knew at the time of the marriage the applicant
was deportable).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
53. Flores v. INS, 66 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 1995) (involving welfare fraud), withdrawn,
73 F.3d 258 (9th Cir. 1996); Izedonmwen v. INS, 37 F.3d 416, 417-18 (8th Cir. 1994) (involving
Pell Grant fraud). On rehearing in Flores, the Ninth Circuit filed an unpublished memorandum
disposition distinguishing between commission of and conviction for fraudulent acts in finding bad
moral character per se. Flores v. INS, No. 94-70178, 1996 WL 5569, at *1-*2 (9th Cir. Jan. 5,
1996) (citing 8 U.S.C. § l101(f) (1994)), on reh'g from, 66 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 1995). The BIA
erred, the court held, in finding per se bad moral character based on acts committed outside the
seven-year continuous residency period, for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1). Id. at *2. The
BIA could, however, find that the prior bad acts indicated "her moral character remained poor"
after the inception of the seven-year period. Id. This satisfied the "catchall clause" of § 1101(f).
Id. ("The fact that any person is not within any of the foregoing classes shall not preclude a find-
ing that for other reasons such person is or was not of good moral character.") (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(f)).
54. Tukhowinich v. INS, 64 F.3d 460, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1995) (ruling that BIA improperly
failed to review all facts of alien's case, including political conditions in native country and partic-
ular and unusual psychological hardship alien would face upon deportation, and that BIA's order
failed to adequately articulate reasons for denying relief); Watkins v. INS, 63 F.3d 844, 848 (9th
Cir. 1995) (finding abuse of discretion in agency's failure to mention several relevant factors in
decision denying extreme hardship, to consider cumulative effect of factors, and to offer reasoned
explanation for decision); Acosta-Montero v. INS, 62 F.3d 1347, 1350-51 (11 th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that the agency abused its discretion when it did not consider new evidence of applicant's
changed family responsibilities); Castrejon-Garcia v. INS, 60 F.3d 1359, 1362-63 (9th Cir. 1995)
(ruling that applicant's eight-day trip to Mexico did not interrupt required continuous presence);
Foroughi v. INS, 60 F.3d 570, 575-76 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that an applicant does not lose
eligibility to apply for discretionary relief when lawful permanent resident status ended with final
deportation order after he had achieved seven years of continuous lawful residence); Rodriguez-
Gutierrez v. INS, 59 F.3d 504, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that departures of one or two days
each did not interrupt continuous physical presence, and that the BIA abused its discretion by not
meaningfully addressing positive equities in denying relief); Avelar-Cruz v. INS, 58 F.3d 338, 341
(7th Cir. 1995) (noting that in accumulating seven years of continuous residence an applicant need
not be a lawful permanent resident to be lawfully domiciled in this country); Biggs v. INS, 55
F.3d 1398, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that IJ abused discretion in essentially ignoring evi-
dence of serious illness and refusing to allow physician to testify by telephone); Delmundo v. INS,
43 F.3d 436, 438, 443 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that BIA did not adequately consider hardship that
applicant's deportation would cause to her family).
1996]
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III. ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION:
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Background
Before 1952, the United States had no mechanism in place for providing
sanctuary to persons in fear of persecution, other than through special legisla-
tion or by designating the person as a parolee.55 Since World War II, Con-
gress has frequently amended the statutory provisions governing refugee status
and asylum admissions.56 The Refugee Act of 1980, the most significant re-
cent legislation affecting refugees, incorporated U.N. convention standards in
an effort to improve the handling of refugee admissions.57 Despite these
changes, however, the United States is still far from having a truly adequate
and reliable system for processing the great number of immigration applica-
tions received each year.58
To qualify for either asylum or withholding of deportation, an applicant
must first show that she qualifies as a refugee.59 Under the statute, a refugee
is a person outside the country of her nationality who is unwilling or unable to
return to that country because of a well-founded fear of persecution based on
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.' The applicant must show that a reasonable person in her position
would fear persecution; only once this is established does the applicant's sub-
jective fear become relevant.6
Applicants for refugee status and applicants for asylum must both satisfy
the statutory criteria expressed in § 1101(a)(42), but annual quotas are placed
only on refugee applications, not requests for asylum.62 Gaining refugee
55. BOSWELL & CARRAsco, supra note 3, at 143. A "parolee," as the term was originally
used, described an alien who could be removed from a vessel pending the ultimate outcome of her
case. Id. at 42. Statutory authority for parole is now contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)
(1994).
56. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 13, at 694.
57. BOSWELL & CARRAscO, supra note 3, at 145.
58. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 13, at 694; see infra note 187.
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994). Although applicants for refugee status, asylum, and withhold-
ing of deportation must all show varying degrees of persecution based on the same statutory lan-
guage, each category faces different procedural hurdles. An application for refugee status differs
from that of asylum because it is based, in part, on the applicant's location at the time of applica-
tion. If the person is outside her home country, but not in the United States, the application must
be for refugee status. If the person is within the United States, the application must be for asylum.
BOSWELL & CARRASCO, supra note 3, at 146. Asylum differs from withholding of deportation by
the degree of power that the Attorney General wields over the application. Asylum is available
only as a discretionary grant by the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1158. Conversely, withholding
of deportation is mandatory if an alien meets the statutory requirements. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1994).
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1994).
61. Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990). The narrow scope of current
immigration law governing refugee status has prompted intense litigation, especially where the
applicant's homeland is experiencing internal armed conflict. For a discussion of the current trend
toward disallowing generalized claims of fear of violence to satisfy the statutory persecution re-
quirement, see Mark R. von Sternberg, Emerging Bases of "Persecution" in American Refugee
Law: Political Opinion and the Dilemma of Neutrality, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 1 (1989).
62. BOSWELL & CARRASCO, supra note 3, at 145.
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status does not therefore necessarily guarantee admission into the United
States.63
Although both asylum and withholding of deportation prevent forcible
return to a country where persecution is likely, important differences distin-
guish the two forms of relief.64 The Attorney General is statutorily prohibited
from deporting an alien to a country where her life or freedom would be at
risk.' However, even if an alien meets the statutory requirements and estab-
lishes refugee status, the Attorney General can refuse to grant asylum and
order deportation of the applicant.' As a practical matter, when faced with
an application for both asylum and withholding of deportation, the decision-
maker reviews the asylum request first.67 If the applicant cannot meet the less
stringent standard for a grant of asylum, the agency denies the entire applica-
tion.6'
At first glance, withholding of deportation seems a more favorable status
for the alien than asylum; however, the scope of relief available under with-
holding of deportation is limited.' Asylum status confers upon the alien em-
ployment authorization,7 ° the opportunity to include her spouse and minor
children in the grant," and the possibility of an adjustment of status to per-
manent resident." Conversely, withholding of deportation does not provide
for inclusion of the alien's family, and the alien's status cannot adjust to that
of permanent resident.73
Tenth Circuit decisions during the past year demonstrate a reluctance to
grant asylum absent clear evidence of an objective basis for petitioner's fear of
persecution.74  As the following cases show, many obstacles prevent
63. Id. at 145-46.
64. Jividen, supra note 7, at 943. In practice, the INS treats all applications for asylum filed
during exclusion or deportation proceedings as applications for withholding of deportation as well.
8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1995).
65. The statute providing for withholding of deportation states: "The Attorney General shall
not deport... an alien ... if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom
would be threatened ... on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (emphasis added). This provision does not
apply to aliens who have participated in the persecution of other groups, or been convicted of a
"particularly serious crime." Id. § 1253(h)(2)(A)-(D). In addition, an alien is not eligible for with-
holding of deportation if the Attorney General finds "serious reasons" to believe the alien commit-
ted a "serious nonpolitical crime" in another country or represents a "danger to the security of the
United States." Id.
66. The statute providing for asylum states that it may be granted "in the discretion of the
Attorney General." Id. § 1158(a) (emphasis added).
67. Hadjimehdigholi v. INS, 49 F.3d 642, 646-47 (10th Cir. 1995).
68. Id.
69. Evangeline G. Abriel, Presumed Ineligible: The Effect of Criminal Convictions on Appli-
cations for Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Under Section 515 of the Immigration Act of
1990, 6 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 27, 33-34 (1992).
70. Id. at 33.
71. Id.
72. Jividen, supra note 7, at 944.
73. Abriel, supra note 69, at 34.
74. As increasing numbers of asylum-seekers have come to the United States from nations
such as Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, the tension in American immigration law has
become more apparent, and the treatment of these asylum-seekers by the United States has be-
come highly controversial. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 13, at 690; see also Tonnas, supra
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applicants from meeting their burden because: (1) claimed persecution based
on subjective fear alone does not suffice;75 (2) evidence of firm resettlement
in a third country bars an application for asylum;76 and (3) in one instance,
the court even required a petitioner to carry the burden of negative proof of a
foreign law." In addition, the court remanded one case to the BIA because it
incorrectly required an alien to establish a nationality of origin as a prerequi-
site to a grant of asylum.78 Issues of credibility peppered many decisions,
causing the Tenth Circuit to stray from what sometimes appeared to be a
"rubber stamp" affirmation of administrative decisions. For example, in one
case, the court required the BIA to state with specificity the basis for its deter-
mination that certain testimony was not credible.79
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Hadjimehdigholi v. INS"°
a. Facts
Hadjimehdigholi served in the Iranian army from 1959 until 1986." In
1963, as a tank commander under the Shah, he led one of the four tank units
instrumental in quelling an uprising by supporters of the Ayatollah
Khomeini.82 He later received commendations for his part in putting down
this revolt. 3 Hadjimehdigholi's military records reflected his activities against
Khomeini supporters, but the new government failed to discover them when
the Ayatollah came to power.8 " In his application for asylum and withholding
of deportation, he claimed that it was only a matter of time before the Iranian
government discovered his early military activities.85 In support of his
claimed fear of persecution, Hadjimehdigholi offered evidence of other mili-
tary officers put to death because of their involvement in anti-Khomeini activi-
86ties.
note 13, at 308 (discussing how the 1990 INA "highlights the right of the sovereign to exclude
immigrants for any reason").
75. Hadjimehdigholi, 49 F.3d at 646.
76. Abdalla v. INS, 43 F.3d 1397, 1399 (10th Cir. 1994).
77. Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 1994).
78. Dulane v. INS, 46 F.3d 988, 997, 999 (10th Cir. 1995).
79. Id. In addition, the court remanded at least one decision to the BIA because of its failure
to articulate a reason for finding the petitioner's testimony not credible. Velis v. INS, No. 94-
9526, 1995 WL 66536, at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 13, 1995) (unpublished decision). Credibility deter-
minations are critical to the process because often an applicant's own testimony is essentially the
only evidence offered in support of the applicant's "well-founded fear of persecution." See, e.g.,
Deborah Anker & Carolyn P. Blum, New Trends in Asylum Jurisprudence: The Aftermath of the
U.S. Supreme Court Decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, in 22ND ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE 147 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 384,
1989).
80. 49 F.3d 642 (10th Cir. 1995).
81. Hadjimehdigholi, 49 F.3d at 644.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 644-45.
85. Id. at 645.
86. Id. at 648-49. Although the court was unpersuaded in this case, circumstantial evidence
involving persons similarly situated can be used to show the required objective fear of persecu-
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The IJ ruled that although Hadjimehdigholi had established a subjective
fear of persecution upon his return to Iran, he did not prove the required ob-
jective fear of persecution. 7 Unconvinced that a reasonable person in the
petitioner's position would fear persecution based on race, religion, nationality,
political beliefs, or membership in a social group, the U denied
Hadjimehdigholi's application.8
The BIA affirmed the U's decision, stating that Hadjimehdigholi's fear
was based on speculation 9 and that a grant of asylum requires hard evidence
of the likelihood of persecution." The BIA pointed out that Hadjimehdigholi
had served in the Iranian army for several years after the Ayatollah came to
power, and that the Khomeini government did not persecute him, but rather
promoted him several times and even granted him a pension upon his retire-
ment.9'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the BIA applied the correct standard for
determining asylum eligibility. 92 Although Hadjimehdigholi demonstrated a
subjective fear, he failed to provide evidence supporting an objective fear of
persecution on any of the enumerated statutory grounds.93
2. Abdalla v. INS94
a. Facts
Petitioner, a Sudanese national, lived for twenty years in the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) under a "residence" visa/permit prior to entering the United
States.95 Denying Abdalla's application for asylum, the BIA held that under
recent regulatory amendments to 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(2),96 an alien's firm
resettlement in a third country prior to entering the United States precludes a
grant of asylum based on persecution in his native country.97 The firm reset-
tlement in a third country presumably demonstrated that Abdalla found a safe
haven in the UAE, which undermined an asylum claim based on feared perse-
cution in his native country.9"
tion. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(A)-(B) (1995).




91. Id. at 647.
92. Id. at 650.
93. Id. at 648.
94. 43 F.3d 1397 (10th Cir. 1994).
95. Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1398-99.
96. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(2) (1995).
97. Abdulla, 43 F.3d at 1399.
98. Although immigration laws did not specifically contain provisions relating to firm reset-
tlement until the 1980 Refugee Act, the concept has "long been" a part of United States immigra-
tion policy. In re Lam, 18 I. & N. Dec. 15, 19 (1981). However, an alien may be found not to
have "firmly resettled" if the third country restricted the alien's rights significantly more than
those of its own citizens. See generally Arthur C. Helton, Reform of Political Asylum, in 27TH
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b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit upheld the BIA's evidentiary finding that Abdalla had
firmly resettled in the UAE, and it therefore determined that Abdalla was pre-
cluded from a grant of asylum or withholding of deportation."
3. Sadeghi v. INS"e
a. Facts
Sadeghi, an Iranian national, sought asylum and withholding of deporta-
tion, asserting that the Iranian government was attempting to arrest him for
purposes of persecution, rather than for legitimate criminal prosecution, be-
cause he counseled a fourteen-year-old student not to enter the military.'
The IJ ruled that Sadeghi's fear was of criminal prosecution and not persecu-
tion based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or
political opinion, as required under the statute." 2 Consequently, the request
for asylum and withholding of deportation was denied.0 3 The BIA affirmed
the IJ's denial of asylum and withholding of deportation on the same grounds,
but further found the petitioner's testimony not entirely credible.1
0 4
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the BIA that the Iranian government's act
of seeking petitioner for arrest did not qualify as persecution based on statuto-
ry grounds. 5 Rather, the Iranian government was simply trying to prosecute
a criminal act under its laws."°6 Furthermore, the court stated that Sadeghi
was required to disprove the existence of a law that was the basis for his
criminal act, which he did not do.0 7
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Kane argued that there was no evidence
that Sadeghi had violated any law." Furthermore, requiring Sadeghi to dis-
prove the existence of the very law upon which the INS rested its case re-
quired him to go far beyond his own burden."
ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE 145 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Pract. Course
Handbook Series No. 515, 1994) (discussing the asylum process in the United States).
99. Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1399-1400.
100. 40 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 1994).
101. Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1140-41.
102. Id. at 1141.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1142.
105. Id. at 1143.
106. ld. at 1142.
107. Id. at 1143. The majority concluded that requiring the government to produce evidence
of a foreign law would run contrary to the requirement that the petitioner bear the burden of proof
throughout the asylum hearing. Id.
108. Id. at 1145 (Kane, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1146. The dissent also pointed out a fact the majority did not address: Iran is a
signatory to an international treaty which prohibits participating countries from permitting or re-
quiring children to participate in wars. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 25,
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4. Dulane v. INS...
a. Facts
Dulane entered the United States from Somalia on June 11, 1983, under a
student visa."' Although he possessed a Somalian passport, Dulane was ac-
tually an Ethiopian national." 2 He filed asylum applications in September
1983 and June 1988, but received no response from the INS to either applica-
tion."3 The INS denied his third application for asylum, filed in November
1988." ' After hearing the case, an IJ ruled that Dulane's deportability had
been established, and that he had only provided evidence of general political
upheaval in his native country, a ground insufficient to satisfy the refugee
requirement for a grant of asylum."5
Dulane then filed a motion to reopen" 6 with the BIA, alleging new facts
in support of his application.' The BIA denied the motion, stating that even
in light of the new facts Dulane failed to establish a prima facie case of eligi-
bility for asylum." 8
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the BIA had not sufficiently articulated its
reasoning for denying the motion," 9 reversed the decision, and reviewed the
art. 38, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448,
1470 (1989). The United States also signed this treaty on February 16, 1995. Sandra L. Jamison,
Proposition 187: The United States May Be Jeopardizing Its International Treaty Obligations, 24
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 229, 233 (1995). And although Congress must still ratify this treaty
before it becomes binding, the United States has demonstrated a clear intent to join the other 169
signatories worldwide. Id. If this Iranian law does, in fact, exist, its enforcement in this instance
would amount to a direct "conflict with fundamental human rights under both the Geneva Con-
vention and customary international law." Sadeghi, 40 F.3d at 1147 (Kane, J., dissenting).
110. 46 F.3d 988 (1995).
111. Dulane, 46 F.3d at 990.
112. Id. at 992. Petitioner explained that in order to flee Ethiopia, he had acquired a Somalian
passport on the black market. When filling out his application, he was instructed by INS staff that
his country of origin must match the passport in his possession. Id.
113. Id. at 990.
114. Id. at 990, 993.
115. Id.
116. A motion to reopen, available only in limited circumstances, requires the petitioner to
meet a heavy burden of proof. Barbara Hines, Asylum and Withholding of Deportation, in IMMI-
GRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 411, 429-30 (R. Patrick Murphy et a]. eds., 1992).
The motion must be consolidated with any petition requesting review of a final deportation order,
8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(6) (1994), and will not be granted unless the respondent offers material new
evidence unavailable during prior proceedings. Yee, supra note 20, at 615. Filing a motion to
reopen does not stay deportation proceedings, and the alien may be forced to leave the country
while the motion is pending. Id. at 622.
117. Dulane, 46 F.3d at 993.
118. Id. at 994. The new evidence, which the Tenth Circuit referred to as "significant," in-
cluded "an affidavit by ... a long-time family friend, explaining Dulane's father's position in
relation to the Ethiopian government, as a leader of the Ogaden secessionist movement... [and]
an affidavit of Dulane outlining facts which he had learned since the hearing before the U from a
friend who immigrated to Canada." Id. at 995.
119. As in cases involving credibility, discussed supra note 79, the Tenth Circuit demands
enough specificity for an adequate review of the administrative decision. See, e.g., Dulane, 46
F.3d at 994 (scrutinizing the BIA's decision for "procedural regularity" and consideration of all
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evidence presented by Dulane."2 ° Upon examination, the court concluded that
the BIA had failed to address whether Dulane had a well-founded fear of
persecution if he returned to either Ethiopia or Somalia, and remanded for
further proceedings on the issue."' Specifically, the Tenth Circuit ruled that
the BIA erred in requiring Dulane to establish his nationality as a prerequisite
to a granting of asylum. The statute lists no such requirement.'22
C. Analysis
Both asylum and withholding of deportation decisions rely heavily on the
quality of factual evidence the applicant puts forth, and can pose problems for
reviewing courts. Since review is necessarily limited to evidence submitted to
the agency during administrative proceedings, the circuit courts all demonstrate
a heavy reliance on the agency's judgment in making factual determinations.
As the decisions over the past year show, only when the agency's determina-
tion is clearly unsupported by evidence contained in the record will the Tenth
Circuit disturb the administrative ruling.
D. Other Circuits
A variety of issues faced other circuit courts during the past year in their
review of denials of asylum and withholding of deportation. On June 6, 1993,
a Chinese ocean liner, the M/V Golden Venture, ran aground on a sandbar 100
yards from the shore in New York harbor.'23 Several of the Chinese immi-
grants aboard presented applications for asylum and withholding of deporta-
tion, claiming persecution based on China's family planning policy.'24 The
circuit courts held uniformly that evidence of this national policy, on its own,
failed to establish evidence of persecution necessary for asylum or withholding
of deportation.'25
relevant factors).
120. Dulane, 46 F.3d at 996.
121. Id. at 999.
122. Id. at 997; 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1994).
123. Approximately 300 illegal Chinese immigrants were aboard, each having paid approxi-
mately $35,000 to a Chinese gang for passage to the United States. Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48
F.3d 1331, 1334 & n.l (4th Cir. 1995). When the ship ran aground, hundreds of the immigrants
attempted to swim to shore. Id. INS officials apprehended most of the would-be immigrants, but
10 died before reaching the shore. Id. News of the Golden Venture refugees was widely reported
across the United States. See generally Malcolm Gladwell & Rachel E. Stassen-Berger, Immigrant
Boat Tragedy Ended 4-Month Odyssey, CHI. SUN TIMES, June 8, 1993, at 10; 'Well-Coached'
Chinese Refugees Await Hearings, BALTIMORE SUN, June 8, 1993, at 12A.
124. The People's Republic of China imposes a "one couple, one child" policy on its citizens
and requires forced abortion/sterilization of those who violate the policy. Chen Zhou Chai, 48
F.3d at 1334-35.
125. Id. at 1334, 1339-40. In Chen Zhou Chai, for example, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the
applicant failed to show persecution for his political opinions despite his wife's forced abortion,
his sterilization, and the government's imposition of a fine equal to 12 times his annual salary. Id.;
see also Chang Lian Zheng v. INS, 44 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that the BIA's determi-
nation that applicants were not entitled to asylum because of China's population control policy
was not arbitrary and capricious). Some commentators have accused the INS and the Clinton
Administration of bias in asylum proceedings requested by the Golden Venture aliens. Robyn K.
Pretlow, Attorney General's Motion for a Protective Order Limiting the Scope of Discovery Depo-
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Numerous other decisions rendered by circuit courts over the past year
articulated a variety of reasons for denying relief to the applicants. 2 6 How-
ever, a significant number were remanded by the circuit courts to the BIA for
reconsideration.' 27 In one case, the Second Circuit ordered payment of
attorney's fees to the prevailing applicant when the court determined that the
government's position in litigation was not substantially justified. 2
sitions Is Denied in Golden Venture Litigation, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 221, 221 (1995).
126. Hamzehi v. INS, 64 F.3d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that applicant failed to
establish requisite "selective and severe" injuries on which to base a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion); Ahmetovic v. INS, 62 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming denial of political asylum de-
spite BIA's failure to consider the underlying circumstances of alien's conviction for first-degree
manslaughter); Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that evidence did not
establish well-founded fear of persecution despite alien's having successfully shown existence of
private discrimination against Coptic Christians); Adhiyappa v. INS, 58 F.3d 261, 263, 268 (6th
Cir. 1995) (finding that applicant who provided names of student activists to the government was
subject to persecution by separatists because of his activities, not his political opinions); Gomez-
Mejia v. INS, 56 F.3d 700, 702 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming that former soldier did not establish
possibility of persecution in Nicaragua because he had never expressed his political opinion);
Urukov v. INS, 55 F.3d 222, 228 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that, although applicant demonstrated
that members of his ethnic group were treated as "second-class citizens," he failed to establish that
he had been "singled out" for persecution); Anton v. INS, 50 F.3d 469, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1995)
(finding that applicant's inability to refute evidence that Romania's current government allows the
free practice of religion precluded his showing of religious persecution); Bevc v. INS, 47 F.3d
907, 910 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that although this "may not be an ideal time for any non-Serbi-
ans to be living in Serbia," general unrest does not satisfy the requirements for fear of persecu-
tion); Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339-40 (9th Cir. 1995) (ruling evidence that applicant received
a jail-cell beating and that his home had been stoned by ethnic Fijians unconnected with the gov-
ernment was insufficient to establish persecution); Kazlauskas v. INS, 46 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir.
1995) (ruling that dramatic changes in applicant's country of origin since his departure prevented
demonstration of well-founded fear of persecution); Ozdemir v. INS, 46 F.3d 6, 7-8 (5th Cir.
1994) (affirming the BIA's conclusion that even if applicant's testimony was credible, he had
failed to establish past persecution based on one beating and two subsequent police questionings);
Cuevas v. INS, 43 F.3d 1167, 1169, 1171 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that harassment following
applicants' refusal to sell land to individuals suspected of acting on behalf of the "armed wing of
Communist Party of the Philippines" was not basis for well-founded fear of persecution); Jukic v.
INS, 40 F.3d 747, 748, 750 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that applicant's fear of persecution based on
his having ignored a recall notice to serve in the Yugoslavian army did not warrant grant of asy-
lum or withholding of deportation); Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 188-90 (5th Cir. 1994) (ruling
that Saudi Arabia's failure to grant citizenship to individuals of non-Saudi heritage born within its
borders did not reach level of individualized persecution because "statelessness alone does not
warrant asylum").
127. Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1504, 1510 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that an applicant
beaten by police for suspected military connections was not required to show nationwide persecu-
tion); Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, 57 F.3d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1995) (remanding case due to the
BIA's failure to consider testimony regarding treatment of military deserters or whether applicant's
desertion based on "political neutrality" represented a political opinion); Singh v. Moschorak, 53
F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that in denying the petitioner's application, the BIA
wrongly assumed that fortitude in the face of danger demonstrated an absence of fear); Sanon v.
INS, 52 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1995) (criticizing the BIA's failure to demonstrate that it had
actually considered the fact that the applicant escaped from Burkina Faso, in West Africa, only
because of an error and was the only student to successfully immigrate to the United States);
Makonnen v. INS, 44 F.3d 1378, 1384 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the BIA's requirement that an
Ethiopian national demonstrate persecution of all members of her ethnic group, especially since
her grasp of English was such that she likely used the term "Oromo People" to mean "members of
the Oromo Liberation Front," a political group); Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 492 (1st Cir.
1994) (expressing "grave doubts" that a reasonable fact-finder could decide the applicant, a Guate-
malan national, was ineligible for asylum after disregarding 150 pages of information concerning
60 specific acts of persecution).
128. Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 62 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1995).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION
PROCEDURES
A. Background
Congress first provided for expedited processing of immigrant visa appli-
cations submitted by those aliens who married United States citizens when it
enacted the War Brides Act of 1945.29 By marrying a United States citizen,
an immigrant can obtain an immigrant visa, 3' obtain admission into the
United States (if not already present), and apply for permanent residency after
three years of residency. 3' The relative ease with which marriage conveys
an immigrant visa, and subsequent permanent residency, creates a tension be-
tween the objective of preventing fraud and abuse and that of facilitating fami-
ly unification.'32 In response to this concern, Congress complicated the pro-
cedure by enacting a two-year administrative process for deciding permanent
residency applications based on marriage."'
The BIA in In re Garcia,'34 an interim decision, established a rule that
"pending prima facie approvable visa petition[s] would be treated as though
[they] were already approved for purposes of reopening."'35 Thus, a marriage
between an alien and a United States citizen was considered prima facie valid
under the Garcia analysis.'36 Following the enactment of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 (IMFA)' and the Immigration Act of
1990 (IA), 3' however, the BIA modified this holding in In re Arthur,
39
Under the Arthur rule, the INS presumes that marriages entered into after
deportation proceedings have begun are fraudulent; hence, the BIA will reject
motions to reopen while visa petitions are pending.' The following case ex-
amined the constitutionality of the Arthur rule.
129. Act of Dec. 28, 1945, Pub. L. No. 271, 59 Stat 659 (1946).
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
131. Id. § 1430(a) (1994).
132. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 13, at 161.
133. See Mary L. Sfasciotti & Luanne B. Redmond, Marriage, Divorce, and the Immigration
Laws, 81 ILL. B.J. 644, 644-46 (1993) (suggesting that the IMFA creates an "administrative trap
for the unwary").
134. 16 I. & N. Dec. 653 (1978).
135. In re Arthur, No. A-29575767, 1992 WL 195807, at *3 (B.I.A. May 5, 1992) (citing In
re Garcia, 16 I. & N. Dec. at 653).
136. See, e.g., id.
137. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537
(1989) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1186(a) (1994)). The IMFA was enacted to deter fraud
by aliens seeking to acquire lawful residency in the United States through marriage to a United
States citizen or lawful permanent resident by requiring a two-year foreign residence requirement
when the marriage was entered into after initiation of deportation proceedings by the INS. See
Sfasciotti & Redmond, supra note 133, at 645-48 (describing the provisions of the 1986 IMFA).
138. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1991). The IA exempted
qualified applicants from the two-year foreign residence requirement and the bar to adjustment
imposed by the 1986 amendments. See Sfasciotti & Redmond, supra note 133, at 648 (discussing
the 1990 revisions to the IMFA).
139. No. A-29575767, 1992 WL 195807 (B.I.A. May 5, 1992).
140. In re Arthur, 1992 WL 195807, at *4.
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B. Rezai v. INS' 4'
1. Facts
Petitioner Saeed Rezai, an Iranian national, arrived in the United States on
a student visa in 1986 after residing in Germany for seven years.42 He grad-
uated from college in 1990, but did not apply for asylum until eight months
after the INS initiated deportation proceedings against him for overstaying his
student visa.'43
During the proceedings with the INS, Rezai claimed that while residing in
Germany he participated actively in the Council of Iranian Royalists, an activi-
ty which would result in his persecution if the United States forced him to
return to Iran." The tribunal doubted the credibility of this assertion, how-
ever, because petitioner only raised this issue after the INS brought deportation
proceedings against him, not in his original residency application.'45
In addition to a claim for asylum, Rezai sought residency status through
marriage to two different United States citizens.'" The first marriage in 1988
ended in divorce in 1990.'7 In 1991, Rezai entered into a second marriage,
six months after the IJ had issued a deportation order.' The INS rejected
the subsequent application for an immigrant visa filed by his wife because the
evidence showed that Rezai had entered into his first marriage fraudulently,
for the purpose of receiving immigration benefits.' 9 The BIA denied the mo-
tion to reopen and reconsider this ruling based on the Arthur rule.' Rezai
appealed this decision, asserting that application of the Arthur rule was a
violation of his First Amendment right to familial association."'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit rejected this constitutional attack, stating that the BIA's
decision not to reopen the proceedings was motivated by a bona fide desire
not to interfere with the role of the district director in adjudicating outstanding
visa petitions.'52 The court held that the BIA's decision not to interfere with
the district director's power to hear visa petitions did not violate petitioner's
First Amendment rights.
5 3
141. 62 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir. 1995).
142. Rezai, 62 F.3d at 1287.
143. Id. at 1288.
144. Id. at 1287-88.
145. Id. at 1288.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1288, 1290.
149. Id. at 1290.
150. Id. at 1290-91.
151. Id.
152. Id. The court stated that so long as the basis for the decision is facially legitimate, the
Arthur rule does not violate the First Amendment. Id. Note that in denying this motion, the BIA
did not foreclose all avenues of relief for petitioner. His visa application, filed by his new wife
after their marriage, was still pending. Id.
153. Id. at 1292.
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C. Analysis
Rejecting a visa application based on suspected fraudulent marriage is
consistent with other forms of deportation relief that rely on the applicant's
good moral character.'54 Because strong policy motivations support family
unity, aliens can qualify for permanent residency rather expeditiously through
marriage to a United States citizen. 5 This policy goal is tempered, however,
by the government's fear that ignoring evidence of "sham marriages" may lead
to a rash of visa applications based on marriages to United States citizens."6
D. Other Circuits
The Eleventh Circuit upheld a constitutional attack, on equal protection
grounds, of a decision in which the I ruled an alien ineligible to file for a
waiver of deportation based on his marriage to a lawful permanent resident
and the fact that his child was a United States citizen.'5' The court held that
the BIA had created two virtually identical classifications of aliens in waiver
of deportation decisions-the only difference being that one class departed and
returned prior to filing for the waiver.' As such, the BIA's interpretation
was unconstitutional as applied.'59
The Seventh Circuit decided two cases involving sham marriages entered
into for the purpose of circumventing immigration laws. In Yong Hong Guan
v. INS," the Court of Appeals upheld a BIA deportation order based on a
sham marriage, even though the applicant had subsequently remarried another
United States citizen and given birth to a United States citizen. 6' The court
cited "legitimate concerns regarding the administration of the immigration
laws" in support of its conclusion.'62 Ghaly v. INS6 ' involved another con-
stitutional challenge, based on the Fifth Amendment procedural due process
guarantee." Ghaly charged that the INS's failure to provide him with a
copy of his first wife's statement denying the validity of their marriage de-
prived him of the opportunity to address the evidence against him or
adequately prepare a defense.'65 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument,
stating that the summary the agency provided sufficiently satisfied procedural
due process."
154. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
155. See Sfasciotti & Redmond, supra note 133, at 649. Some have criticized amendments to
the statutory scheme providing for residency through marriage as an attempt to "micro-manage the
problem of marriage fraud by an elaborate administrative process." Id.
156. In support of the proposed 1986 Marriage Fraud Amendments, the INS reported to Con-
gress that a full 30% of marriage-based visa applications were fraudulant. Sfasciotti & Redmond,
supra note 133, at 645. The basis for this study has subsequently been challenged. Id.
157. Po Shing Yeung v. INS, 76 F.3d 337 (1 lth Cir. 1995).
158. Id. at 339.
159. Id. at 344.
160. 49 F.3d 1259 (7th Cir. 1995).
161. Yong Hong Guan, 49 F.3d at 1260-61.
162. Id. at 1263.
163. 48 F.3d 1426 (7th Cir. 1995).
164. Ghaly, 48 F.3d at 1434.
165. Id.
166. Id. The Arthur rule has withstood attack in other circuit courts: Dielmann v. INS, 34
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V. DEPORTATION OF PERSONS CONVICTED OF CRIMES
A. Background
Non-citizens" may be deported under U.S. immigration laws for crimes
committed within the United States. The Immigration and Nationality Act
provides the Attorney General with the authority to denaturalize, and even
deport, undesirable citizens.'" Two statutes under Title 8 of the U.S. Code
compel the deportation of alien criminals: § 125169 and § 1253. '70 Section
1251 provides for deportation based on four criminal categories: 7 ' general
crimes,1 72 controlled substances violations,'
73 certain firearms offenses, 7 1
and miscellaneous crimes." '75 Section 1253 precludes relief of withholding of
deportation for an alien convicted of a particularly serious crime. 76 The pro-
visions applicable to the Tenth Circuit cases decided over the past year con-
cern general crimes (including aggravated felonies)'7 7 and controlled sub-
stances violations.
17 8
Under § 1253, the Attorney General is instructed not to deport any person
whose deportation would threaten that person's life or freedom on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. 79 This withholding of deportation does not apply, however, if the
Attorney General determines that an alien convicted of a particularly serious
crime "constitutes a danger to the community.""'8 Although the Supreme
Court has recognized deportation as a drastic measure equivalent to
"banishment or exile,"'"' Congress has enacted several major pieces of legis-
lation to respond to growing concern about the relationship between
F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting due process challenge and finding "no deficit, constitu-
tional or otherwise" in the Arthur rule); Pritchett v. INS, 993 F.2d 80, 84 (5th Cir.) (upholding the
Arthur rule as an expression of policy in an "area where the BIA carries expertise and has been
bestowed with broad discretion"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 345 (1993).
167. This includes lawful permanent residents, nonimmigrants, and undocumented aliens.
Minsky et al., supra note 4, at 14.
168. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1451 (1994).
169. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i).
170. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (1994).
171. See generally Robert Frank, Criminal Defense of Foreign Nationals, 167 N.J. LAW. 36
(1995) (discussing deportation of immigrants through criminal procedures).
172. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A).
173. ld. § 1251(a)(2)(B).
174. Id. § 1251(a)(2)(C).
175. Id. § 1251(a)(2)(D).
176. Id. § 1253(h)(2)(B).
177. For purposes of § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii), an aggravated felony encompasses conviction for a
crime of violence where the "term of imprisonment imposed ... is at least [51 years." 8 U.S.C. §
1 101(a)(43)(F) (1994).
178. A violation of The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802 (1994), renders an alien
deportable. Frank, supra note 171, at 37-38.
179. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1).
180. Id. § 1253(h)(2)(B).
181. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); see Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S.
276, 284 (1922) (stating that deportation may result in "loss of both property and life, or of all
that makes life worth living").
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immigration and crime. 82 As a result of this recent legislation, the INS be-
gan its Alien Criminal Apprehension Program (ACAP), an aggressive pilot
program created to expeditiously remove criminal aliens from the street, from
the community, and from the United States. 3
Even though conviction of a crime of requisite seriousness renders an
alien deportable under United States immigration law, the citizens of the Unit-
ed States have an interest in requiring the fulfillment of the imposed prison
sentence.' 4 In fact, the statute providing for deportation of criminal aliens
specifically mandates, "An alien sentenced to imprisonment shall not be de-
ported until such imprisonment has been terminated by the release of the alien
from confinement."'
85
The INS has often come under attack for inefficiencies in the system
causing cases to progress slowly.'86 Aliens convicted of qualifying crimes are
released from prison into INS custody to await deportation proceedings.8 7
Congress has articulated the goal, at least for aliens who commit aggravated
felonies, of completing deportation proceedings prior to the end of their prison
term.' However, the statute does not require prior completion of the pro-
ceedings.
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Aggravated Felony Conviction Bars a Withholding of Deportation
In AI-Salehi v. INS, 9 the Tenth Circuit decided an issue of first impres-
sion regarding whether an aggravated felony conviction, without an additional
finding that the alien posed a danger to the community, precluded withholding
of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B)." Congress enacted § 1253
pursuant to Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, which states in pertinent part:
182. Those Acts are: the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207
(1989); the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1990); and the
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1991). Abriel, supra note 69, at
39-40.
183. INS Increases Efforts Against Criminal Aliens, 65 INTERPRETER RELEAsES 955, 955
(1988).
184. Walford v. INS, 48 F.3d 477, 478 (10th Cir. 1995).
185. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(h) (1994).
186. See Kenneth Y. Geman, Important New Asylum Regulations, in 27TH ANNUAL IMMIGRA-
TION AND NATURALIZATION INSTITrE 175 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series
No. 515, 1994). In 1993, 150,000 asylum applications were filed. Of these, only 36,000 were
decided or administratively closed. The rest joined a backlog of nearly 400,000 cases. Id.
187. See Abriel, supra note 69, at 42. Aliens convicted of aggravated felonies are presumed
deportable. Aliens awaiting deportation proceedings must remain in INS custody unless they law-
fully entered the United States and can demonstrate they pose no threat to society and are likely to
appear for any scheduled hearings. Id.
188. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252a(d)(1) (1994). As part of recent legislative reforms designed to
streamline the deportation of convicted aliens, the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR) enacted an institutional hearing program and began holding deportation hearings against
alien criminals in state and federal prisons. INS Increases Efforts Against Criminal Aliens, supra
note 183, at 956.
189. 47 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 1995).
190. AI-Salehi, 47 F.3d at 396.
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1. No Contracting State shall expel ... a refugee ... to... territo-
ries where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed
by a refugee . .. who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of
that country.''
For the decade following the Refugee Act of 1980, In re Frentescu'9 ' set the
standards for interpreting this provision. In re Frentescu did not require an
independent determination of the danger that the applicant posed to the com-
munity,'93 but required a case-by-case determination of whether the offense
was a crime of requisite seriousness.'94
In Arauz v. Rivkind,"' the Eleventh Circuit ruled that conviction of a
"particularly serious crime"' ' was the only evidence required for a showing
of dangerousness to the community. The conviction made the alien per se
statutorily ineligible for withholding of deportation.'9' Based on its interpre-
tation that all applicants have a right to a hearing under 8 C.F.R. § 208,'9'
however, the Arauz court held that an IJ, unlike a district director, must still
consider evidence other than conviction of a serious offense before denying an
application.' 9 In response to Arauz, the Attorney General revised the regula-
tions so that mandatory denial of asylum applications2 would not require a
hearing for aliens convicted of a "particularly serious crime. '2 ' The Immi-
gration Act of 1990202 further simplified the analysis by defining aggravated
191. See Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553, 556-57 (lst Cir. 1993) (internal citations omit-
ted) (emphasis added).
192. 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (1982).
193. In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247. "Withholding of deportation as well as asylum
is not available to an alien who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 'particularly seri-
ous crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States."' Id. at 245 (citing 8
C.F.R. § 208.8(f)(iv) (1995)).
194. Id. at 247.
195. 845 F.2d 271 (11 th Cir. 1988) (superseded by regulation as stated in Narhns v. INS, 972
F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1992)).
196. Arauz, 845 F.2d at 275 (citing Crespo-Gomez v. Richard, 780 F.2d 932, 934 (11th Cir.
1986)).
197. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 276-77.
200. For the conditions required for mandatory denial, see 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(d) (1995).
201. Id. § 208.14(d)(1); see also Martins v. INS, 972 F.2d 657, 662 (5th Cir. 1992) (discuss-
ing the Attorney General's attempt to defeat the right to a judicial hearing created in the Arauz
line of cases).
202. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.).
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felonies as "particularly serious crimes. ' 113 The Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals addressed this issue for the first time in the following case.
a. Al-Salehi v. INS
20 4
i. Facts
AI-Salehi pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute at least 500
grams of cocaine, a statutorily-defined aggravated felony. 25 When the INS
initiated deportation proceedings, AI-Salehi applied for asylum and withhold-
ing of deportation.2" The application included statements from the prosecut-
ing attorney and the presiding judge strongly supporting his request because of
his role in convicting a major drug dealer." 7 The IJ denied the application,
holding that, according to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(d) and 1253(h)(2)(B), an aggra-
vated felony conviction absolutely barred the relief sought.2°" Al-Salehi ap-
pealed only the withholding of deportation to the BIA, which upheld the U's
decision." 9
ii. Decision
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the statutory interpretation employed by
both the U and the BIA, ruling that Al-Salehi's conviction of an enumerated
aggravated felony conclusively disqualified him from seeking a withholding of
deportation.1 0 The circumstances surrounding the conviction, the court stat-
ed, cannot serve to mitigate the effect of the statute."'
203. "For purposes of subparagraph (B), an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated
felony shall be considered to have committed a particularly serious crime." 104 Stat. at 5053, 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1994); see Garcia v. INS, 7 F.3d 1320, 1323 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that Con-
gress intended aggravated felony convictions to function as barriers to withholding of deportation);
Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553, 555, 559 (lst Cir. 1993) (stating that conviction for cocaine
possession with intent to distribute operates as an absolute bar to withholding deportation); Mar-
tins v. INS, 972 F.2d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 1992) (denying withholding of deportation on showing of
conviction for conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute).
204. 47 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 1995).
205. AI-Salehi, 47 F.3d at 391; see 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(43)(B) (1994) (defining drug traffick-
ing as an aggravated felony).
206. AI-Salehi, 47 F.3d at 391.
207. Id. The presiding judge noted that the evidence showed that petitioner had likely been
"prodded" by a "badgering" DEA agent to arrange for the sale, and that the supplier "would never
have been convicted without [petitioner's] assistance and testimony." Id. at 391 n.2 (quoting Re-
cord at 58, Al-Salehi (No. 94-9527)). The prosecuting attorney also wrote of petitioner's "minimal
criminal involvement, sincere remorse, and substantial cooperation in the conviction of a 'signifi-
cant cocaine supplier."' Id. (quoting Record at 56-57, Al-Salehi (No. 94-9527)).
208. Id. at 391.
209. Id.




2. The Legal Effect of the Prison Sentence Determines Deportability
Under § 1251
a. Nam Quoc Nguyen v. INS2 2
i. Facts
Nam, a native and citizen of Vietnam, entered the United States in 1989
and was granted permanent resident status in 1990."3 In 1993, a Kansas
court convicted Nam of aggravated assault and sentenced him to a prison term
of three to eight years.2 The INS subsequently charged Nam with deport-
ability under § 1251.2" Both the I and the BIA found Nam statutorily de-
portable under §§ 1251 and 1101.26 The IJ ruled, and the BIA agreed, that
the indeterminate sentence had the legal effect of at least a five year sentence,
barring Nam from a withholding of deportation.1 7
ii. Decision
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the agency's decision. 2 " The court held
that where Congress has not specifically addressed an issue, an agency has
broad discretion in applying the law, provided its interpretation constitutes a
permissible construction of its enabling statute. 2 9 Furthermore, the statutory
construction employed by the agency need not be the only one it could have
permissibly adopted, or even the construction that the reviewing court would
have applied.22 The BIA did not err, therefore, in considering the maximum
term imposed to define the conviction as an aggravated felony.
2 1
3. Inmates Do Not Have Standing to Compel Their Own Deportation
Under § 1253(h)
a. Walford v. INS
222
i. Facts
An INS deportation order alerted prison officials that upon Walford's
completion of his prison term, they were to transfer him to the INS for pro-
cessing.223 Walford claimed the deportation order violated his due process
212. 53 F.3d 310 (10th Cir. 1995).






219. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
220. Id. at 843 n.l 1.
221. Nguyen, 53 F.3d at 311.
222. 48 F.3d 477 (10th Cir. 1995).
223. Walford, 48 F.3d at 477.
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rights." 4 Since the notice resulted in a higher security classification, Walford
argued that it prevented him from participating in activities that could expedite
his release from prison.2" Walford requested relief in the form of either im-
mediate deportation or a lifting of the deportation order during incarcera-
tion. 26 The district court treated the habeas corpus application as an attack
on the merits of the final deportation order and dismissed the motion for lack
of jurisdiction.2"
ii. Decision
The Tenth Circuit treated Walford's petition as both a writ of habeas
corpus228 and a writ of mandamus.229 The Tenth Circuit upheld the district
court's denial of the writ of mandamus, agreeing that an inmate cannot compel
deportation proceedings.23 An administrative decision by the INS to delay
deportation proceedings pending an inmate's release is immune from judicial
review.23" '
As for the habeas petition, Walford denied that the petition attacked the
merits of the final deportation order; he alleged, rather, that the existence of
the order violated his due process rights.232 The Tenth Circuit ruled that ab-
sent an attack on the merits of the order, the petition did not constitute a due
process violation.233 The detainer itself clearly instructed prison officials that
its existence did not limit their decisions affecting "the offender's classifica-
tion, work and quarters assignments or other treatment which he would other-
wise receive." '234
224. Id. at 477-78.
225. Id. at 477.
226. Id. at 477-78.
227. Id. at 478. Attacks on the merits of final deportation orders must be brought directly
before the circuit court of appeals, which serves as the forum for judicial review of agency de-
cisions. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(2) (1994).
228. Walford, 48 F.3d at 477. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) authorizes issuance of writs of habeas
corpus.
229. Walford, 48 F.3d at 477. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994) pertains to writs of mandamus.
230. Walford, 48 F.3d at 478.
231. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45 (stating that courts may not substitute their judg-
ment for an agency's reasonable interpretation). Appellate courts from other circuits have ruled
similarly on writs of mandamus. See Rodriguez v. INS, 994 F.2d 110, 111 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that an alien may not be deported before completing term of imprisonment); Perez v. INS, 979
F.2d 299, 301 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that the INS cannot be compelled to deport a prisoner).
232. Walford, 48 F.3d at 478.
233. Id.; accord McDonald v. New Mexico Parole Bd., 955 F.2d 631, 635 (10th Cir. 1991)
(dismissing writ of habeas corpus upon finding that an unexecuted detainer warrant does not deny
any constitutional rights, even though petitioner claimed it prevented him from taking advantage
of prison programs).
234. Walford, 48 F.3d at 478.
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b. Hernandez-Avalos v. INS23
i. Facts
Four aliens convicted of deportable offenses sought a writ of mandamus
compelling the INS to initiate deportation proceedings against them.236 The
district court dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction, stating that no law
applied to the case because the Immigration Act itself did not contain any
criteria for evaluating the government's actions, and no relevant regulations
existed."7
ii. Decision
The Tenth Circuit ruled that, at a minimum, no private right of action
exists under § 1252(i).2"' Additionally, since legislative history indicated
congressional intent that no one would be able to satisfy the "zone of inter-
ests" test in a suit to enforce § 1252(i), "no would-be plaintiff has standing to
bring suit, either directly under the statute or by way of the Mandamus
Act.9
239
As an alternative basis for denying the petitioners' relief, the court stated
that the "zone of interests" test under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
governs standing to seek mandamus 4.2 ' Both the APA and the Mandamus
Act compel "wrongfully withheld agency action, 24' with the analysis focus-
ing on whether the defendant agency has failed to discharge a duty owed to
plaintiff.242 The question, then, was whether these plaintiffs satisfied the zone
of interests test, and should therefore be heard,243 regardless of whom the
statute was enacted to benefit. 2" The court determined that Congress did not
235. 50 F.3d 842 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 92 (1995).
236. Hernandez-Avalos, 50 F.3d at 843.
237. Id. The underlying statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(i) (1994), states only that deportation should
begin "expeditiously" after conviction.
238. Hernandez-Avalos, 50 F.3d at 844.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 845 n.7.
242. Resilient Tile Layers Local Union No. 419 v. Brown, 656 F.2d 564, 566-67 (10th Cir.
1981).
243. Hernandez-Avalos, 50 F.3d at 847.
244. Id. at 847-48. The court stated that the legislative history behind § 1252(i) makes it clear
that the statute was enacted to benefit the taxpayer by avoiding the costs associated with main-
taining deportable criminal aliens:
These people are not being deported; the expedited procedure is not working; the local
and State jails are jammed up, the Immigration and Naturalization Service has no incen-
tive to give priority to these because the burden of inaction falls on State and local
governments and not on the Federal system.
Id. at 848 n.12 (quoting 132 CONG. REc. H9794 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep.
MacKay)). The court quoted Senator Alan Simpson:
Not only will the Federal prison system benefit from an enhanced program to deport
aliens in its custody, but even . . . greater benefits can be anticipated at the State and
local level, if the program can reach that far. It may well be that a supplemental request
may be necessary to provide for additional personnel and resources to expedite these de-
portations. However, any such increases would be but a small fraction of the cost to
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intend to create a duty to plaintiffs by enactment of the statute, nor that incar-
cerated aliens would enforce the statute. 45
C. Analysis
American citizenship is a precious right which some fear recent develop-
ments in United States immigration laws will dangerously erode.2" Compet-
ing policy considerations come into play when examining the issue of alien
criminals. Although United States citizens have an interest in seeing justice
served through incarceration of the alien criminal, imprisonment is expensive
and places an ever-increasing burden on the already overcrowded prison sys-
tem.
247
Immediate deportation of alien criminals also presents a host of problems.
In addition to negating the deterrence effect of incarceration, many deported
criminals may simply re-enter the United States. These returning criminal
aliens have the potential to further impact negatively on society, financially or
otherwise.
The current strategy of conducting deportation proceedings after the term
of the alien's incarceration, although resulting in longer periods of detention,
represents the most prudent approach. The valid interests of the United States
in maintaining the highest level of social order should subordinate any frustra-
tion experienced by aliens awaiting the slow process of deportation.
D. Other Circuits
When faced with aliens convicted of aggravated felonies, other circuits
have consistently ruled that a bar of discretionary relief from deportation does
not require a separate finding of dangerousness. 21 In a case of first impres-
sion, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the aggravated felony conviction language
contained in § 1251 referred to all aggravated felonies, regardless of the
provide prison and jail space for these individuals.
Id. (quoting 132 CONG. REC. S16,908 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Simpson)).
245. Id. at 847-48.
246. See generally Jeffrey A. Evans, DenaturalizationlDeportation: What Standards for With-
drawing the Welcome Mat?, 23 U.S.F. L. REv. 415 (1989) (discussing the denaturalization and
deportation of "undesirable citizens" accused of committing serious crimes prior to entering the
United States).
247. See Walford v. INS, 48 F.3d 477, 478 (1995) (stating that Congress considered the deter-
rent effect of prison sentences, and the savings that could be realized by deporting aliens without
imprisoning them first, when enacting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(h), which requires an alien criminal to
serve the entire prison sentence); see also New York Deports 86 Illegal Aliens, PATRIOT LEDGER,
Aug. 29, 1995, at 02 (reporting that criminal aliens comprise approximately 5% of the state's
"costly and overcrowded prison system").
248. See Kofa v. INS, 60 F.3d 1084, 1088-89, 1091 (4th Cir. 1995) (including survey of five
other circuits not requiring separate determination); see also Ramsey v. INS, 55 F.3d 580, 584
(11 th Cir. 1995) (holding that lewd assault was a "crime of violence" constituting an aggravated
felony for purposes of deportation); Samaniego-Meraz v. INS, 53 F.3d 254, 257 (9th Cir. 1995)
(ruling that aggravated felony bar pre-dates enactment of Anti-Drug Abuse Act); Gjonaj v. INS,
47 F.3d 824, 826 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that assault with firearm with intent to murder qualifies
as a "particularly serious crime" to bar relief from deportation).
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date.249 Two other circuits decided cases involving the moral turpitude provi-
sion of § 1251, ruling that second-degree malicious mischief is not a crime of
moral turpitude,' ° but that first-degree incest is.25
In a case involving a writ of habeas corpus, the Ninth Circuit, reversing a
view articulated in a previous decision, 252 ruled that incarcerated aliens do
not have standing to compel expedited deportation hearings.25 a In another ha-
beas action, the Ninth Circuit held that an excludable alien has no private right
of action to assert procedural due process rights concerning admission or ex-
clusion;254 rather, the Attorney General has the authority to detain an
excludable alien indefinitely if undeportable.255
CONCLUSION
At first glance, many of the Tenth Circuit's immigration rulings seem
somewhat harsh. Stories of political upheaval, warfare, and tragic economic
hardship strike a sympathetic chord in most. Analyzed in light of the legisla-
tive history and congressional intent underlying current immigration policy,
however, it becomes apparent that this narrow construction remained true to
the letter of the law during the 1994-95 survey period.
The United States, for very practical reasons, can only afford to welcome
aliens whom society deems beneficial and, hence, "worthy" of citizenship.
Immigration laws provide a structure for determining this worth based on
established public policy goals. The agencies and courts, on the other hand,
provide the mechanism which tests these goals. Combined, the structure of
these laws and enforcement mechanisms theoretically ensure that each appli-
cant is evaluated in light of both practical and idealistic goals.
Kathleen M. Kelly
249. Asencio v. INS, 37 F.3d 614, 617 (11 th Cir. 1994).
250. Rodriguez-Herrera v. INS, 52 F.3d 238, 240 (9th Cir. 1995).
251. Gonzalez-Alvarado v. INS, 39 F.3d 245, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1994).
252. Garcia v. Taylor, 40 F.3d 299, 304 (9th Cir. 1994), superseded by statute as stated in
Campos v. INS, 62 F.3d 311,314 (9th Cir. 1995).
253. Campos v. INS, 62 F.3d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1995).
254. Barrera-Echavaria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1449 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 479
(1995).
255. Id. at 1444.
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